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Abstract
Within the past decade, migration has become an increasingly controversial subject in
Western countries, producing a right-wing and nationalist backlash. In Europe, Germany became
the core of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and gained global attention for Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s open-door policy towards refugees. This substantial influx of refugees into the country
caused a sharp discursive shift regarding migrants and refugees in the German media during and
after 2015. At the same time, Donald Trump announced his eventually successful presidential
campaign by cultivating a starkly anti-immigrant platform, which generated disproportionate
media attention for his campaign and intensified anti-immigrant rhetoric in mainstream media. In
both countries, the discourse on migrants and refugees derived from similar racist historical
stereotypes about men of color being sexual predators. I argue that despite the differences in the
German and American contexts of these discursive shifts, the similar discursive trends in both
countries’ mainstream media and the manufactured, transnational accumulation of racist rhetoric
on social media demonstrate that migration is the primary issue that increasingly unifies
right-wing parties.
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1. Introduction
The year 2015 marked a watershed moment for public discourse on migration in both
Germany and the United States, though for different reasons; Germany accepted an
unprecedented one million refugees during the Syrian refugee crisis, the most of any EU country,
just as Donald Trump announced his presidential campaign in the U.S. with an inflammatory
speech that labeled Mexican immigrants as “rapists and criminals” (Lee 2018). The similarities
that these countries share render their comparison a fruitful exercise to examine the subject of
migration discourse in developed Western countries, but the differences between the German and
American contexts are perhaps even more pertinent to the development of migration discourse,
in which one of the universal key actors is the media.
In both countries, the media has played a critical role in molding discourse about
migrants by normalizing discriminatory labels used to describe migrants. This paper analyzes the
extent to which discursive shifts occurred in and around this pivotal year in Germany and the
U.S. in their respective historical contexts. After paying due attention to the specific
sociocultural and economic contexts of each case, I demonstrate that both cases do not exist in
separate vacuums, but are symptomatic of a broader transatlantic far right phenomenon that
hinges foremost on the issue of migration and relies increasingly often on social media as its
primary vessel.
Specifically, I concentrate on crossnational discourse about male migrants and analyze
their perceived reputation as perpetrators of sexual violence, which in both countries has
constituted much of the cited rationale behind the racist rhetoric that proliferates in nationalist
right wing political parties. In examining the driving factors behind the changing discourse in
Germany and the U.S., I further demonstrate the transnational nature of anti-immigrant discourse
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by analyzing specifically the role of foreign intervention - Russian media manipulation
particularly - although the existing literature lacks precise and thorough research in this area,
partly due to the recency and inherent elusiveness of the topic. I examine the specific Russian
interests in destabilizing Western democracies through the distribution of fake news and
hot-button phrases targeting immigrants and refugees of color.
In my literature review, I evaluate existing research on migration discourse in each
country and the role of both social and mainstream media in Western migration discourse. I
justify my focus on the right wing by examining the role of political leaning in the volatility and
intensity of this overall rhetoric. I also present a brief anthropological framework to establish the
broad assumptive lens of my arguments and clarify the nuanced distinctions among the
terminology salient to discourse analysis. Then, I further justify my selection of Germany and the
U.S. as the optimal case studies for interrogating the nature of transnational ideological diffusion
linked to migration. In my case studies and analysis, I rely chiefly on news reports, journalistic
pieces, politicians’ direct statements, and opinion polls as my primary sources, while analyzing
and drawing from the arguments of scholarship on migration discourse that often employ the
same or similar sources as evidence.
I argue that the shared discursive patterns in Germany and the U.S. in 2015 demonstrate
an increasingly unified and global white supremacist movement, fueled by far-right politicians
and foreign powers whose shared advocacy of racist historical narratives targeting migrant men
of color in mainstream media overrides their other ideological differences. This movement relies
on social media to amplify the ideas of far-right parties into mainstream media platforms, which
feeds into a cycle of cumulative racism.
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2. Literature Review
Until recently, the existing body of academic research on right-wing discourse
concentrated chiefly on national media outlets, print publications, and television programs. Since
2018, scholarly interest in political discourse has shifted to analyze the transatlantic proliferation
of right-wing populism through social media hubs like Facebook and Twitter. In his research
study, Mattias Ekman determines the rendering of migrant stereotypes online and the salient role
of emotions in stoking racist rhetoric. He argues that the spread of emotionally charged
anti-immigrant speech online has normalized racism in mainstream media by turning neutral
news subjects into covert denunciation of migrants (Ekman 2019).
Using the case study of Sweden, Ekman affirms Liz Fekete’s proposed idea of
“cumulative racism,” in which social media amplifies the rhetoric of fringe parties into
mainstream platforms, allowing the hate speech to circulate in public and gain credibility by
mere means of exposure. This process, Ekman argues, continually augments the boundaries of
acceptable speech in mainstream media, which I propose is paramount to understanding Donald
Trump’s accruement of both domestic and international support. Ekman determines that
Facebook contributes to cumulative racism, generated first by common users and displayed later
in more mainstream platforms. However, he does not specifically interrogate the agency of
politically interested parties or state actors in determining the discursive direction, focusing
rather on the bottom-up flow of discourse.
Tobias Heidenreich et al. address the top-down angle of discourse by analyzing European
politicians’ rhetoric on Facebook. They find that the frequency of negative migration discourse
on politician accounts is directly related with both the volume of immigrants in a receiving
country and the ideological extremity of the politician’s party, both on the left and the right
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(Heidenreich et al. 2019). This finding is particularly significant to migrant discourse analysis
because, contrary to conventional belief, it argues that the far-right is not the only driving agent
behind negative migrant discourse; the far-left contributes indirectly to the volatility of migrant
discourse because of its emotionally charged, one-sided rhetorical framing of the issue to appeal
to the same voting demographic as the far-right, even though the far-left essentially disagrees
with the right on migration policy. Heidenreich posits that 2015 was a turning point for
migration-related discourse in the West, citing the influx of more than a million Syrian refugees
to continental Europe, particularly to Germany, which was recognized as the core of the refugee
crisis (2019). Journalist Heather Horn of The Atlantic argues that the phenomenon was
unprecedented and mentions that the U.S. experienced no such migration parallel in 2015, an
observation which encompasses the tension between my case studies.
More recent literature regarding the American discourse on migration tends to view
Donald Trump’s emergence in politics as a default turning point, but it is important to note that
migration has long been a contentious topic of political debate in the U.S. Although the symbol
of the wall at the Mexican border seemed to rise to the forefront of migrant discourse after
Donald Trump’s firm campaign promise to build the barrier in 2015, the idea of the wall did not
originate with Trump. Leo Chavez points out that Herman Cain, a Republican presidential
candidate for the 2012 election, promised to build a border wall in October 2011 (2013, 3). In an
even earlier 1997 piece on immigrant discourse, Hugh Mehan underscores the repetitive use of
the term “illegal alien” in California Proposition 187, which encouraged voters to exclude the
children of undocumented immigrants from public schools and health facilities. Mehan argues
the term “illegal alien invokes images of foreign, repulsive, threatening, even extraterrestrial
beings” (1997, 258).
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Since negative migrant discourse in the U.S. has a long history, literature on the influence
of Donald Trump on migrant discourse always necessarily addresses the special role of social
media as a vessel for his political success and unique cult of personality. In his book on social
media and globalization, Ralph Schroeder argues that traditional media platforms were not the
active instigators of Donald Trump’s disproportionately high airtime during his presidential
campaign; rather, they “were compelled to give a lot of time to Trump’s view” (2018, 64).
Schroeder writes: “The role of Twitter can be singled out here: it was a transmission belt to
visibility in traditional media” that was unprecedented (65). Therefore, he views the discursive
spectacles of Trump through a similar lens to Fekete’s “cumulative racism” paradigm.
However, although Schroeder examines the case studies of the U.S., Sweden, India, and
China to discuss how social media has bolstered nationalism in these countries, he does not
address the possibility of transnational discursive interplay between these or other countries that
may partly explain the burgeoning global populist phenomenon he describes. I argue that the
rising nativism in each country is not only a response to local conditions, but to the ontological
anxieties produced by an increasingly globalized and digitalized world in which information
from around the world, both factual and flawed, is more accessible than ever. In my research, I
will examine the role of transnational media coverage in distributing and influencing the
discursive style and content of right-wing politicians in the U.S. and Europe. My research deals
with the question of whether the issue of migration in 2015 has produced an identifiable, if
imagined, global right-wing community through media discourse. I am interested in both the
distinct driving actors and sociological forces behind the formation of this community.
Therefore, I further the existing literature by focusing specifically on Russian
manipulation of migrant media narratives and the common stereotype of men of color as sexual
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predators. The former point examines the agenda of external politically motivated actors to
destabilize Western democracies, particularly Germany and the U.S., through capitalizing on
internal discord. The latter perspective is critical to understanding migrant discourse because it
furnishes a point of universality for racist accusations against migrants among different host
countries in the West. I will demonstrate the historical roots of this stereotype in the U.S. and
Germany, whose contrasting historical attitudes towards migrants and differing geography render
the two countries apt case studies for examining how the contemporary migration question may
have produced transnational ideological solidarity.
Theoretical Framework for Discourse
As Hillary Parsons Dick posits, post-truth is an integral component of contemporary
migrant discourse and refers to the practice of rejecting factual truths that disadvantage a certain
group’s favorability and instead accepting emotionally biased perceptions as truth. She further
presents the nuances of post-truth:
… post-truth epistemology produces… spectacles in which factual truths are
established, verified, and authorized through the use of a semiotics of
individuation that favors peculiarity and simplicity over patterns and complexity.
A “spectacle” can be understood as a form of public engagement in which the
determination of issues of broad social concern is organized by processes of
commodification, such as branding (2018, 180).
Dick examines post-truth in the context of Trump’s Mexican border wall campaign
promise, which she claims became a rallying cry for his supporters. I will extrapolate this
paradigm to evaluate the discourse in both Germany and the U.S., arguing that post-truth extends
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beyond the American context. In order to conduct effective and precise discourse analysis, I will
also lay out the semantic parameters of my paper’s discussion of migration, beginning with the
distinction between the terms “migrant” and “refugee.” Common discourse perceives migrants to
have a variety of motivations for leaving their home country, commonly economic reasons,
while the term refugee indicates a person who flees from violence, natural disaster, and/or
political unrest in their home country. The consensus in literature is that the term refugee evokes
more sympathy from receiving countries than the word migrant, and that the media employed
this distinction to frame the topic of migration in a biased light. Jakob Moritz-Eberl et al. write
that English newspapers and tabloids often favored the term “migrant” rather than “refugee” or
“asylum-seeker” in their coverage of the 2015 refugee crisis to subtly de-legitimize the dire
circumstances of refugees, a choice which acknowledges the less sympathetic implications of
“migrant” in common discourse. Furthermore, according to Bastian Vollmer and Serhat
Karakayali, refugee men, unlike children and women, “tend to be seen as illegitimate - an
economic migrant who does not deserve protection” (2017, 3). This perspective invalidates
economic motivation as a necessary reason for migration. Therefore, the blurred distinction
between migrant and refugee also emerges from this gendered perspective, which will play a
salient role in my later discussion of the racist sexual predator stereotype.
The differing linguistic implications of the construction of migrant discourse in a
receiving country and the inherent “othering” of migrants by nature of the term necessitate the
consideration of Michel Foucault’s widely assessed theory of normalization. Foucault argues that
parties who possess knowledge possess power, which then reproduces and redistributes
knowledge by the will of the empowered, allowing them to determine the parameters for the
conditions that constitute “normal” in a society. The process of normativity imbues daily
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language with inclusive terminology indicating the empowered “normal” and exclusive
terminology to delineate marginalized, powerless, and “abnormal” groups (Power 2011, 39) . In
my paper, I will assume Foucault’s theory to analyze the language used to describe migrants and
refugees, demonstrating that such discourse in a receiving country deprives migrants and
refugees of individual agency in the collective imagination.
3. Justification of Case Study Selection and Historical Context
I.

Similarities
Germany and the U.S. share key similarities relevant to the topic of migration: both are

developed, leading GDP democratic countries with majority white populations, and both have a
history of institutionalized racism, Germany through the Holocaust during the Nazi regime and
the U.S. through the slavery of black people and genocide of Native Americans. According to the
OECD, Germany became the second most common destination in the world for permanent
migration in 2015, while the U.S. retained its spot as the number one destination (Migration Data
Brief 2019). Germany also has the highest GDP in Europe, ranking fourth in the world behind
the U.S., China, and Japan (World Population Review 2020). Given their high influx of
permanent migrants, Germany and the U.S. comprise a compelling comparative case study for
evaluating discourse about migration.
II.

Geography
However, there are also foundational differences that I must address to establish the

assumptions, arguments, and parameters of this paper. Firstly, Germany and the U.S. differ
greatly in their geography; Germany, a country smaller than Texas, borders nine other countries
in the middle of continental Europe with a relatively close proximity to the Middle East, whereas
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the U.S. is located in North America, bordering only Canada and Mexico. The differing locations
determine the flow and demographic characteristics of migrants in each country.
This geographical distinction alone, however, is not meaningful enough in the context of
discourse analysis to constitute the basis for this research paper, though it is necessary to explain
the varying demographics of the refugees and migrants in each location—Germany’s location
offers greater accessibility for Syrian refugees (and historically, Turkish and Italian immigrants
during the 1970s guestworker program), whereas the U.S. southern border has helped to make
Mexico the most common origin country of immigrants to the U.S. (Pew Research).
III.

Differing Historical Reputations on Migration
The second pertinent difference between the two countries is their seemingly contrasting

attitudes towards migration and ethnic diversity in the popular Western imagination. The Nazi
regime’s agenda of racial cleansing and nationalism during the Holocaust ties inextricably into
the world’s collective imagination of Germany; the term “Nazi” has even become synonymous
with the concept of evil and any mildly punitive figure in mainstream Western culture. Both ends
of the post-WWII political spectrum in West and East Germany have commonly used “Nazi” as
a reference point of immorality for arguments against the other side, while labeling itself the
“true” antidote to Nazism (Herzog 2007, 221). Only during the 1960s did West Germany open
up its borders for guest workers from other countries such as Italy, Turkey, and Vietnam to
stimulate the economy, and many guest workers decided to permanently reside in Germany,
which was not the intent of the state. Guest workers often faced daily racism and antisemitism in
both East and West Germany, and locals often adhered to the notion that even the German-born
children of immigrants could never be “true Germans,” a notion reflected in the German law
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determining citizenship only through blood relation, which remained in effect until 2001
(Radvan and Troschke 2012, 23).
On the other hand, the founding of the U.S. by English colonists has generated the
historical reputation of an inherently hospitable “country of migration,” a concept further
consolidated in the globally recognized symbols of the Statue of Liberty in the 19th century and
Ellis Island in the early 20th century. This romanticized facade of American hospitality indeed
conveniently overlooks the country’s ironic foundational violence against Native Americans, the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Japanese internment camps, and other racist and/or
anti-immigrant politics in U.S. history. Nonetheless, the U.S. has consistently hosted more
immigrants than any other country (U.S. Department of State). Therefore, the historical
background of each country (and consequently the country’s unique formation of nationalism) is
a possible influencing factor in the discursive treatment of migrants. Germany first became a
unified nation only in 1871 and experienced more than four decades of political division as East
and West Germany during the Cold War, reunifying a mere thirty years ago in 1990. In
comparison, the history of the U.S. has been less turbulent, its most glaring period of political
polarization culminating in the 19th century Civil War, which is followed only by the Civil
Rights Movement a century later—both heavily entrenched in the racial topic of rights for black
people.
IV.

Patterns of Migrant Intake Over Time
The third and final potential point of tension is the proportion of migrants in each

country. There are currently 83 million people living in Germany, compared to about 328 million
in the U.S. While data on migrants is difficult to collect due to undocumented migrants and
non-permanent migrants, the Federal Statistics Office of Germany estimates that about 12.5

Chang 15
percent of the population in Germany were foreign nationals (including undocumented people)
as of 2018, the most recent available year of migrant data collection (Reuters 2018). The U.S.
had a slightly higher proportion of immigrants in the country at about 13.7 percent of the total
population in 2018, only a slight uptick compared to 12.9 percent in 2010 (Migration Policy
Institute 2020). Although the proportion of immigrants in each country in 2018 seems effectively
the same, it is imperative to note that Germany’s share of immigrants rose quickly since 2010,
most notably in the 2015 refugee crisis, marking a departure from the steady American increase.
The share of immigrants in Germany jumped from 8.8 percent in 2010 to 12.5 percent in 2018, a
significantly more drastic uptick than in the U.S. case over the same period (Statista).
Critically, it is not the population size or proportion of migrants that bears the most
significance in the country comparison, but the presence or lack thereof of a major migration
event in the past decade. For Germany, it was the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis—for the U.S., no
such influx occurred.
V.

Significance of Differences
Therefore, despite the similarities that render Germany and the U.S. a strong comparison,

this research project finds itself in the unusual position of having three potential contributing
factors in its analysis: the geography of each country, the differing historical narratives, and the
pattern of migrant intake over time. These factors are important to explain the specific context in
which discourse on migrants changed in each country. However, I do not aim to isolate a single
factor or argue that any one factor was the primary contributor to the discursive shifts. Rather, I
argue that the cyclical media rhetoric of politicians and the general population allowed the
mainstream discourse on migrants in both countries to converge along the same racist
stereotypes. They also enabled each country’s politicians to cite the migration circumstances of
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the other in their arguments. This phenomenon attests to a broader political movement that must
be situated in the global tide of discourse, due to the inherently international nature of migration.
The international convergence of racist discursive construction of migrants has overridden the
significance of any local particularities in receiving countries.
The following section will examine specific events in their historic context surrounding
the year 2015, establishing that both countries experienced a discursive shift, but one (Germany)
by means of a true uptick in migrant population and the other (the U.S.) through cumulative
racism in social media on which right-wing politicians capitalized. In my analysis, I will
demonstrate that the similar discursive patterns and direct political cross-referencing between the
two countries, despite their other differences, demonstrate a larger transnational discourse that
has fallen under the control of a strengthening global far-right movement.
4. Case Studies
Germany
I.

Initial Discourse During Germany’s Long Summer of Migration
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to accept more than one million Syrian refugees

into Germany in 2015 became widely remarkable for the significance of the “one million”
threshold, a common indication of the presence of a truly high volume of anything, as Vollmer
and Karakayali argue. The German media underscored this number; the major newspaper
Augsburger Allgemeine published a wary headline in 2015 that read: “One million refugees? The
atmosphere is threatened to change” (Vollmer and Karakayali 2017, 1-2).
Despite this implied “threatened” state of the country, Vollmer and Karakayali maintain
that initially, the attitude of much of the German population revealed itself to be more
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welcoming and less hostile than expected, as volunteers waited at train stations to welcome
Syrian refugees with singing and applause that ultimately earned the name “September fairy
tale” (2017, 10). The term “fairy tale” particularly emphasizes the unlikelihood of such an
accepting atmosphere towards migrants, indicating a laudable deviation from the expected
response to the arrival of an unprecedentedly high volume of refugees. Even the conservative
newspaper Die Welt published sympathetic images of refugee children to supplement their
emotional stories, although Die Welt u ltimately “leans much more towards closure and the
problematization of migration,” which became obvious later in Germany’s refugee timeline
(Griebel and Vollman 2019, 1). Nonetheless, from the joyous celebrations at train stations and
Merkel’s resonant slogan “we can do this” emerged the term Willkommenskultur (or “welcome
culture”) as Germany seemed to redefine itself as a proudly hospitable nation.
Instrumental to the phenomenon of Willkommenskultur was the German media, which
mobilized support for refugees through its distribution of sensational images that provoked moral
outrage from German viewers. News outlets capitalized especially on the drowning of the
three-year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi in September 2015 during his family’s attempt to cross
the Meditarranean. The image of his lifeless body on the beach in Turkey elicited a strong
sympathetic response from viewers due to his youth and thus his perceived innocence, producing
an association between refugees and victimhood rather than threatening invaders. This
atmosphere of sympathy emerged alongside similar solidarity among media outlets
representative of the average German like the Bild, which popularized the slogan “Refugees
Welcome.” At the same time, the number of volunteers for refugee work increased significantly
in “a population that was hitherto not active in terms of refugee support” (Vollmer and
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Karakayali 2017, 7-11). Thus, September 2015 marked an unprecedented event in German
migrant history in terms of the mobilization of the German population in support of refugees.
II.

Cologne 2016 — Discursive Shift Along Gendered and Racial Lines
However, as Vollmer and Kayakali argue, “the atmosphere of hospitality was always

fragile,” (2017, 11) as Germany witnessed a significant discursive shift less than half a year later
that illustrates the fluctuation of sympathy for refugees based on gender that nonetheless
produces consequences for the overall perception of refugees and their “deservingness.” The
most significant turning point of discourse was the series of New Year’s Eve sexual assaults of
women in Cologne in 2016, which were allegedly committed by a group of “North African” men
who were reported to have arrived in Germany during the Long Summer of Migration. The
outrage surrounding the assaults correlated with the increase in the proportion of people who
believed that Germany could not sustain the current volume of refugees from 46 to more than 60
percent (Vollmer and Karakayali 2017, 13).
Most significantly, the media quickly emphasized the gendered aspect of the sexual
assaults, depicting the perpetrators as “an attack on German gender norms” (Boulila and Carri
286). This development marked the shift of attention from innocent refugee children like Aylan
Kurdi to the adult male sexual perpetrators of Cologne 2016 as the new face of refugee
discourse. According to Vollmer and Karakayali, refugee men, unlike children and women, “tend
to be seen as illegitimate—an economic migrant who does not deserve protection” (2017, 3).
This perspective invalidates economic motivation as a necessary reason for migration. Thus, the
distinction between migrant and refugee also emerges from this gendered perspective, with
refugees seen as driven out of their home country by immediate physical danger while migrants
are perceived to be motivated by other less severe reasons. Die Welt, the conservative Berlin
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paper which had participated in sharing sympathetic or neutral views of refugees at the beginning
of the Long Summer of Migration, published an opinion article boldly named “The Mob Has
Raped Us All” less than a week after the assaults. Remarkably, the author of the article is
infamous for condemning feminism, despite springing to the defense of female bodily autonomy
in his article, revealing the hypocrisy of his alleged stance. At the same time, Cologne activist
and feminist Alice Schwarzer also positioned herself as anti-Muslim, attributing feminism
exclusively to European society and juxtaposing its liberal values with the threatening and
specifically male presence of Muslim refugees (Boulila and Carri 288). As I later demonstrate in
my historical analysis of racist stereotypes, this paradigm of masquerading as a defender of
women’s bodies derives from a long global tradition of instrumentalizing women’s bodies as a
talking point to fuel racism against the perceived “other.”
The perceived depravity of the refugee men and connotation with degenerative terms like
“mob” and “terror” produced a swift backlash against refugees overall and became a popular
justification for the belief that refugees were undeserving of sympathy and hospitality of
Germans, who increasingly saw Cologne as “proof” that asylum seekers could not integrate in
Germany (Boulila and Carri 2017, 288). “Failed Willkommenskultur” and the supposed failure of
political correctness emerged as common themes in discourse as a result of this single event. The
sexual assaults allowed right-wing groups like the AfD to gain traction and champion “honesty,”
a term that veils racist rhetoric with an apparently morally upright defense of feminism and
Western values that are perceived to be the antithesis of Islam’s “backward” concepts of gender.
This culturally-focused racist discourse preceded new stricter immigration policies that meant
faster deportations and a limit on refugee acceptances into Germany with the 2016 Immigration
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Law, and since 2014, there has been a documented 364 percent increase in attacks on refugees in
Germany (Boulila and Carri 2017, 291).
The swiftness and severity of backlash against refugees from the isolated Cologne sexual
assaults highlight the volatility of discourse on refugees in Germany since 2015, as Vollmer and
Karakayali demonstrate in their research. This complicated reality rests on the dynamic that
“when German citizens provide hospitality… it is implicitly expected and required that refugees
respond with gratitude” (Vollmer and Karakayali 2017, 12). This expectation constitutes an
unequal power dynamic between the volunteer, who possesses the power to provide or refuse
aid, and the thus agency-deprived refugee. Therefore, Cologne became the powder keg for an
already delicate relationship.
United States
I.

Pre-Trump Discourse on Immigrants
At the time of Donald Trump’s 2015 controversial speech labeling Mexicans rapists,

security and immigration on the southern U.S. border had long been the subjects of contentious
political debate. The U.S. began to view the securitization of the Mexican border as a military
issue in the 1950s as the perception of Mexican migrants as dangerous became more common,
and the number of Mexican migrants coming to the U.S. increased significantly in the 1980s,
situating the Mexican border at the center of immigration debate. However, migration from
Mexico has been at net zero in recent years, rendering perceptions about overwhelming
migration unfounded (Dick 2019). Nonetheless, inflammatory rhetoric from politicians warned
that illegal aliens from Mexico would swarm the country; conservative political commentator Pat
Buchanan announced in 2009 on MSNBC that “Mexico is the greatest foreign policy crisis I
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think America faces in the next 20, 30 years… We’re going to have 135 million Hispanics in the
United States by 2050, heavily concentrated in the southwest. The question is whether we are
going to survive as a country” (Chavez 2013, 1).
From the usage of terms like “survive” emerges what Leo Chavez calls the “Latino
Threat Narrative,” which hypothesizes that Latinos, unlike other previous immigrant groups in
the U.S., will not integrate into U.S society and thus pose a threat against which the U.S. must
defend itself. This narrative and its precursors (e.g. the Chinese immigration threat, the Catholic
threat) purport to express the “truth” about migration by painting migrants in a hostile light
without ever producing evidence to support these claims. Chavez cites the example of a 2010
Republican campaign advertisement that depicted three Latino-looking young men above the
caption “illegal aliens,” even though the photo was taken in Mexico and offered no proof that
these men were indeed illegal migrants or had ever set foot in the U.S. (Chavez 2013, 2). This
example is also significant because of its decision to use Latino men as the face of the
anti-immigration campaign even before Trump’s ascension to the political arena, while Middle
Eastern men became the target of racist attacks after the Cologne 2016 sexual assaults.
Chavez particularly condemns the role of the media in perpetuating this narrative by
objectifying Latinos through spectacles, which he defines as “productive acts that construct
knowledge about subjects in our world.” This objectification, evident in the way Pat Buchanan’s
diction frames Latinos as akin to an invasive foreign species that threaten the survival of the
U.S., leads to the dehumanization of Latinos, which erodes the empathy people have for them
(2013, 3-6). In a 1997 piece on immigrant discourse, Hugh Mehan cites the rhetoric of Peter
Wilson, Governor of California in 1994, who used the term “flood of illegal immigration”
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(Mehan 1997, 258). The choice of the word flood emphasizes the overwhelming and harmful
nature of immigrants, who are represented here not as individuals but rather as an invasive mass.
II.

Islamophobic Discourse in the U.S.

Mexican migrants are not the only major discursive target of conservatives in the U.S.
Since the 9/11 terror attacks, Islamophobia has also emerged to the forefront of anti-migrant
rhetoric in the media, thriving independently of Trump, although experts agree that he amplified
the anti-Islamic rhetoric. Khaled Beydoun, author of the book American Islamophobia:
Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear, argues that “even though Islamophobia animates a
modern form of bigotry ... the essence of the hate is not new. It’s deeply rooted in American
political discourse… But it’s been given a new face — a new caricature — as a consequence of
the war on terror, and then intensified by the rhetoric of, mainly, President Trump.” Beydoun
also lays partial blame on the left in the U.S. for racially profiling Muslim Americans during the
Obama Administration in a surveillance agenda intended to thwart terror attacks by extremists
(Underwood 2019).
However, Trump—a fond proponent of the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism”—was
largely responsible for driving public discourse about Muslims into explicitly racist territory.
During a September 2015 campaign rally in New Hampshire, Trump remarked on the Syrian
refugee crisis, promising to expel every Syrian refugee (most of whom were Muslim) from the
country, saying, “They could be ISIS, I don't know. This could be one of the great tactical ploys
of all time. A 200,000-man army, maybe” (Johnson and Hauslohner 2019). This fear-mongering
rhetoric fortifies the stereotype of Muslims necessarily being extremists or terrorists, while
simultaneously attributing to Muslims an exaggerated perception of the inflated power of the
perceived “enemy” through the use of hawk-like phrases such as “tactical ploy” and “army.”
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Here lies the irony of such racist rhetoric; in order to reject the “other,” one must first empower
them in one’s imagination with the capacity for such violence and cohesive hostility.
Moreover, Trump’s track record of anti-Muslim rhetoric even before his presidential
campaign overtly demonstrates not only xenophobia but marked racism against brown people,
particularly through his propagation of the lie that former President Barack Obama was a Muslim
who was not born in the U.S. (Johnson and Hauslohner 2019). This unfounded claim
demonstrates Trump’s hostile conflation of people of color with people of Islamic faith, a
common phenomenon in racist anti-immigrant rhetoric and an indication that such rhetoric harms
not only the named target of discourse but all people of color who share similar identifying
features.
III. Trump and the Supposed Intensification of Anti-Migrant Rhetoric
Although the symbol of the wall at the Mexican border seemed to dominate American
migrant discourse after Donald Trump’s firm campaign promise to build the barrier in 2015, the
idea of the wall did not originate with Trump. Chavez points out that Herman Cain, a Republican
presidential candidate for the 2012 election, promised to build a border wall in October 2011:
“‘It’s going to be 20 feet high. It’s going to have barbed wire at the top. And there’s going to be
a sign on the other side saying, ‘It will kill you - Warning.’ Mr. Cain said later that he was joking
but then quickly added, ‘but… not really’” (Chavez 2013, 3). Trump later echoed this form of
violence-supporting rhetoric, according to two New York Times journalists who claimed that
Trump proposed shooting migrants in the legs at the border and “fortifying a border wall with a
water-filled trench, stocked with snakes or alligators... He wanted the wall electrified, with
spikes on top that could pierce human flesh” (BBC 2019).
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Thus, the right-wing backlash against Mexican migrants in the U.S. cannot be attributed
to Trump alone, as it existed long before he rose to political prominence. Although the content of
Trump’s rhetoric was not novel for the U.S., the spectacle of his successful presidential
campaign breached unprecedented territory, as no candidate with such an openly anti-immigrant
stance had ever attained presidential office. Trump’s election in 2016, however, did not coincide
with a surge in the presence of Mexican migrants in the U.S. Rather, according to the Migration
Policy Institute, the number of Mexican migrants in the U.S. declined from 11.7 to 11.3 million
people between 2010 and 2017, having reached a peak of 12.8 million in 2007 and only
declining ever since (Gonzalez-Barrera 2018).
Therefore, unlike Germany’s Long Summer of Migration and Cologne 2016, the United
States witnessed no major migration event that preceded shifts in discourse on the topic. Rather,
the emergence of Trump’s unusually bold xenophobic statements comprised its own spectacle
that compounded on itself through the media. Trump received disproportionate media attention
during his presidential campaign, earning around 33 percent of news coverage of the GOP
presidential field immediately after his candidacy announcement, compared to the average media
share of the other candidates after their announcements, which was only around 27 percent. Even
almost 30 days after their respective candidacy announcements, Trump’s share of news coverage
remained as high as 30 percent, whereas the other GOP candidates only averaged around 12
percent (Sides 2019).
The above data indicate that Trump stood out from his opponents after his June 2015
presidential candidacy announcement, in which he made the following statement about Mexico:
“They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists” (Time 2015). Thus, the fact
that media attention of Trump sharply increased after this speech attests to the fact that such
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pronounced xenophobia marked a departure from the usual rhetoric in similar political contexts,
establishing a discursive shift in the volume and intensity of these nonetheless pre-existing
perspectives on migrants. Similar to Germany’s escalation of racially motivated hate crimes after
Cologne 2016, the FBI reported that the frequency of violence against Latinos rose sharply by 21
percent in 2018 under the Trump administration, the same year the white supremacist terror
attack in El Paso, Texas claimed the lives of 23 people (Brooks 2019).
5. Analysis
I.

Shared Racist and Sexist Historical Narratives and “The Significant Other”
a. Post-Truth Rhetoric
The diction of Trump’s rhetoric reveals a heavily gendered component to U.S. migrant

discourse, as drugs and rape mentioned in his campaign announcement speech are often
associated with male perpetrators. I have shown above that Germany’s overall discursive shift on
migrants was more dramatic in its content than its U.S. parallel due to the sharp increase of
migrants in the overall population in Germany in 2015. Here, I argue that the discursive shifts in
both the U.S. and Germany cannot be separated from this racialized perspective of male migrants
of color as sexual predators. Given that Mexican immigration began to decrease before Trump’s
announcement and continues to decline, Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric contributes to the
phenomenon of “post truth,” as Hillary Dick argues (2019). Despite Trump’s claims that
Mexicans bring rape and drugs to the U.S., and despite the fact that research on migrants is
difficult to conduct, studies at the time of Trump’s speech and more recently have demonstrated
that “there is no evidence that immigrants [in the U.S.] commit more crime than native-born
Americans” (Lee 2018; Flagg 2019).
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Nonetheless, Trump declared after his campaign announcement that he was simply telling
the truth about Mexicans while offering no evidence: “I can never apologize for the truth. I don’t
mind apologizing for things. But I can’t apologize for the truth. I said tremendous crime is
coming across. Everybody knows that’s true. And it’s happening all the time” (quoted in Lee
2018). As in this statement, the word truth and its variations appear often in Trump’s rhetoric,
which relies on the moral significance of the term and the straightforward framing of his
message to encourage people to believe in his unfounded claims. This phenomenon is also
apparent in Chavez’s aforementioned example of the three Latino-looking men photographed for
a political advertisement that labeled them “illegal aliens,” although no evidence existed to prove
this label true.
Post-truth was also evident following the Cologne 2016 sexual assaults, as this incident
provoked “racist and anti-feminist AfD [proponents to accuse] feminist voices… of masking the
‘real’ dangers German gender equality was facing…. as post-Cologne debates dismissed racism
as ‘hysteria.’” Magazines like Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany published provocative cover
pages, including one depicting a black hand reaching into the genital area of a white woman
(Boulila and Carri 2017, 287-291). The minimalist nature of the image reduced the complexity of
the Cologne incident to literally a black and white issue, announcing that the former group poses
a universal threat to the latter. By labeling the supposedly threatening nature of male migrants as
“real” while rejecting the realness of racism without supporting evidence, these beliefs constitute
a form of post-truth encouraged by the immediate xenophobia that the Cologne New Year’s Eve
incident intensified.
b. Shared Racist Historical Stereotypes
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I maintain that the Cologne assaults intensified the racist discourse against refugee men
and not that it produced this reaction anew, due to the established historical narrative of men of
color as rapists in both Germany and the U.S. Boulila and Carri argue that “the figure of the
‘African rapist’... emerged in the 1920s during the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr,
when the black colonial soldier was imagined to threaten the white Volkskörper” (2017, 288).
This phenomenon earned the title “Black Horror on the Rhine” after the First World War as
Germany assumed the following perspective about Black men: “In stationing colonial African
troops in the Rhineland, France was perceived to have abandoned its civilizing mission and
placed German girls and women at the mercy of ‘primitive’ black men unable to control their
sexual urges” (Campbell 2019, 472). In this narrative, the perceived threat of sexual violence in
particular reveals fears of interracial mixing, and conveniently instrumentalizes the female body
as a political point of reference, apparently upholding the idea of female bodily autonomy only in
relation to the “black sexual predator threat” to fortify racist anxieties against men of color. This
insidious myth of the black man assaulting the white woman preys on white men’s anxieties
about losing their perceived corporeal possession of “their” women.
A similar myth labeling men of color as sexual predators exists in American history.
Biljana Oklopcic, who analyzes the racist stereotype of the black rapist in Tarzan of the Apes,
argues: “Invented after emancipation, the black rapist stereotype was the result of the increasing
panic about racial intermixture after the abolition of slavery and reflected the American South’s
obsession with protecting white womanhood to ensure the purity of the white race” (Oklopcic
2017, 315). Thus, this focus on white racial purity constitutes an antagonist stance not just
against black men but against all men of color, whom racist white men perceive to be genetically
“polluting” agents. In a recent opinion piece condemning Trump’s racist statements about
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Mexicans, Cindy Casares echoes Oklopcic’s point and argues: “[t]here is a perverse pleasure
taken... in generating and regenerating the myth that they are protecting ‘their’ women (and thus
their pale future) from the voracious sexual appetites of nonwhite men” (Casares 2019). Once
again, the sham of defending female bodily autonomy only serves to fuel the desires of racist
white men to exert control and ownership over white women, adding an additionally sexist
component to the racist discourse in which self-proclaimed contemporary feminists themselves
(such as the previously cited anti-Muslim Alice Schwarzer) partake and propagate.
c. The Significant Other
The concept of the “significant other” emerges from this harmful stereotype, which
Werner Schiffauer claims is the group whose practices and beliefs are seen as the antithesis of
the values of one’s own group. Schiffauer claims that Islam has been deemed the significant
other of Europe (Schiffauer 2013, 114). This discourse intensified after the Cologne 2016
incident and Mexican immigrants and refugees emerged as a clear significant other of the U.S.
after Trump’s escalation of racist rhetoric. In both Germany and the U.S., the basis for this
discourse hinged on the historically generated stereotype of migrant men of color as sexual
predators.
II.

The Transatlantic Similarities of Politicians’ Anti-Migrant Discourse

The similarities that Germany and the U.S. share in migrant discourse only suggest a
coincidental overlapping of racist and sexist tendencies in the nationalism of both countries; they
do not necessarily attest to a greater global community effort to push these racist narratives about
migrants. I argue that there exists a greater transatlantic interconnectedness of media in this
dynamic through the presence of discursive interplay between the German and American
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migration contexts, the international appeal of Trump’s personality cult to German right-wing
proponents, and the role of Russian media manipulation in both countries.
a. Trump on Germany’s Handling of the Syrian Refugee Crisis
Politicians in both countries have directly praised their right-wing counterparts in the other
on their stance towards immigration. Trump has openly commented on the Syrian refugee crisis
in Germany. In June 2018, he tweeted: “The people of Germany are turning against their
leadership as migration is rocking the already tenuous Berlin coalition. Crime in Germany is way
up. Big mistake made all over Europe in allowing millions of people in who have so strongly and
violently changed their culture!” (Taylor 2019). Aside from the false claim about high crime
rates in Germany, the diction “strongly and violently” harshly condemns all of the “millions of
people” Trump mentions, and though he does not name Syrian refugees, he heavily implies their
fault with the accusation that they have overhauled the German “culture,” a common argument
of anti-migrant proponents who ascribe to the idea of differential racism. According to Etienne
Balibar, differential racism is based not on the idea of biological superiority between races, but
cultural incompatibility (and implicitly, hierarchy) (Balibar 1991, 21). Trump’s statement is also
an ideal example of how populist rhetoric on both left and right uses simple, emotional,
black-and-white speech to appeal to the fears of its target audience (the anti-establishment
advocates of the masses).
b. AfD on Trump
Even without explicit reference to the topic of migration, Trump’s platform has appealed to
German right wing proponents who claim support for his anti-establishment, nationalist stance:
"The victory of Donald Trump is a signal that the people of the Western world want a clear
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political change," wrote AfD deputy leader Beatrix von Storch in a Facebook post. “This was
only a surprise for the establishment, for me it was expected" (Deutsche Welle 2016). In the
context of the AfD’s platform focus of anti-immigration, von Storch’s usage of the phrase
“Western world” serves as covert recognition of an imagined global white community, which
dabbles in the territory of differential racism by using the cultural/geographical label “Western”
rather than the more biologically evocative term “white.”
c. “Trumpification” of German far-right
Moreover, Trump’s cult of personality has expanded beyond U.S. borders to reach German
supporters. The AfD, unlike the Republican Party, lacks a personality cult among its leadership,
whereas Trump has all but re-branded the GOP with his name. Katrin Bennhold, journalist of
The New York Times, writes in her September 2020 piece on Trump, Germany, and COVID-19
that Trump has increasingly attracted support from the far-right fringe communities in Germany
despite his unpopularity with the country’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and the general
population. Far-right extremism expert Miro Dittrich argues that “Trump has become a savior
figure, a sort of great redeemer for the German far right” (Bennhold 2020). According to
Bennhold, the AfD has modified Trump’s oft-used slogan “America First” to be “Germany
First,” and the white supremacist perpetrator of the February 2020 Hanau terror attack in
Germany explicitly praised Trump’s “America First” policy in his manifesto. Extremism experts
agree that the “Trumpification of the German far right” stokes the flames of radicalism and white
supremacism terrorism, which pose the largest threat to German democracy today (Bennhold
2020).
d. Comparing Trump supporters and AfD supporters
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Indeed, the overlap between German far-right supporters and Trump supporters finds its
similarities mostly in racist ideological leaning and nationalism, not in economic background.
“[I]ncome and material circumstances ... are not especially important for understanding
right-wing populism. Instead, authoritarian attitudes appear to be a much bigger factor,” states a
study conducted by Birbeck College in London (Deutsche Welle 2016). The article also details a
study by the Cologne Research Institute, which finds that most AfD supporters in Germany are
young and male; while Trump voters in 2016 were mostly male as well, they tended to belong in
the above 45 age category. However, the Cologne study “showed that fear of immigration is
spread evenly across income brackets,” and likewise, “[f]or Trump supporters, ‘immigration’ and
‘terrorism’ were the issues that worried them the most” (Deutsche Welle 2016). Therefore, the
association of immigration and terrorism—as well as the common citation of immigration as the
primary concern of right-wing German and U.S. voters—demonstrate that racist concerns of
far-right advocates are universal across transatlantic boundaries, overruling concerns about the
economy and even the age of supporters in the priorities of the global right-wing community.
III.

Cumulative Racism and Foreign Intervention—The Amplification of Social Media
Discourse into the Mainstream
a. Domestic Misinformation and Manipulation

Politicians are only one driving force behind anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media. In order to
understand the normalization of racist discourse in mainstream media, it is necessary to examine
the inevitable interplay between major media outlets, user-generated social media information,
and politicians. In his research on how social media propagates anti-immigrant ideas, Matthias
Ekman describes the process of recontextualization, in which media outlets render neutral news
topics into covertly racist denunciation of immigrants by linking them with negative themes like
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crime and economic difficulties. This process begins with social media users who use the
platform to either knowingly or unknowingly spread misinformation, which anti-immigrant
proponents then amplify into the mainstream:
For example, Facebook users provide anti-immigration actors with raw material
for stories by sharing mainstream news, circulating narratives relating to refugees
and immigrants, or articulating experiences, and in return share the ‘news’
produced by anti-immigration websites. These user practices are not necessarily
intentional; oblivious users share and disseminate information from
anti-immigration actors without reflecting on the reliability or political objective
of the source. In parallel, anti-immigration actors exploit a growing distrust
towards mainstream media, particularly regarding immigration reporting (Ekman
2019).
Ekman derives this analysis from his case study of Sweden, another developed European
country with a high proportion of immigrants in the population. Likewise, Juan Serrano et al. of
the Bavarian School of Public Policy find that the AfD uses similar tactics of exploiting social
media to push their anti-migrant agenda. The AfD has also employed social bots on Facebook
and Twitter to viralize their topics on social media, and Serrano et al. determine that other
right-wing populist parties in Europe follow a similar method of accruing support using
alternative media while decrying traditional media (Serrano 2019). In the case of the U.S., I have
demonstrated in my case studies section that Trump received disproportionate air time on major
news outlets, which then fed into the cycle of his popularity and brand sustaining itself through
social media platforms—even through the circulating discourse of his critics—during the 2016
election.
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b. Russian Intervention in Media and International Right-Wing Agendas
Aside from internal agents interested in driving an anti-immigrant agenda, external forces
have political interests rooted in cultivating a far-right wave across Western countries. Russia,
historically the Western capitalist sphere of influence’s number one enemy during the Cold War,
has demonstrated a consistent agenda in the 21st century to destabilize Western democracies by
taking advantage of existing cleavages in each society. Most notably, Russia intensified its
disruption efforts during the 2016 American presidential election, by hijacking existing hashtags
to polarize social media and using trolls and bots on Facebook and Twitter to overtly promote
pro-Trump ideas:
During the election, for example, a [Russian] imposter Facebook page called
“Being Patriotic” used hot-button words such as “illegal”, “country” and
“American” and phrases such as “illegal alien”, ″Sharia law” and “welfare state”,
according to an analysis of Albright’s data by the Associated Press. The page
racked up at least 4.4m interactions, peaking between mid-2016 and early 2017
(McCarthy 2017).
The association of such negative terms with the slogan “Being Patriotic” reveals the
Russian understanding of the jingoistic and racist sentiments of Trump supporters. Therefore,
Russia’s meddling in the 2016 elections no doubt played a critical role in Trump’s success.
The role of Russian political interference, however, speaks volumes to the strength of
racist anti-immigrant sentiment not only through its moments of success but also in its moments
of failure. The U.S. is not Russia’s only target of disruption; Germany is another critical target
country for disinformation trolls, being a “focal point for Russian and Soviet information
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operations since the Cold War” (CSIS 2020). The AfD is an attractive target for Russian agents
to foster a pro-Russia agenda, and in the most blatant attempt to accrue more AfD supporters,
Russian meddlers fed to major media outlets a fabricated story in 2016 about a Russian-German
girl named Lisa who was raped by migrants, which caused public uproar against Chancellor
Merkel’s open-door policy towards Syrian refugees. The story circulated quickly on social media
and entered mainstream outlets before producers could vet its authenticity (CSIS 2020). In light
of the previous analysis conducted in this paper, the “Lisa” case presents itself as a classic case
of misinformation targeting the racist sentiments of the public, relying on the male migrant rapist
stereotype to provoke widespread outrage against a particular demographic.
However, the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that Germany has
been relatively resistant to Russian manipulation despite the overlapping political history of the
two countries, mainly due to Germany’s well-entrenched media and political institutions. I argue
that Germany’s far-right seduction by Trump’s ideology despite its overall resilience to Russian
interference demonstrates weaker political cohesion in Germany than the CSIS describes;
Russian interference in Germany was unnecessary to push the anti-immigrant agenda. I have
demonstrated the “Trumpification” of the German far-right, through which Trump has become a
figurehead behind which German far-right proponents rally. Therefore, the German far-right’s
transatlantic support for Trump developed independently of these direct Russian media attacks
on Germany. However, it did develop as an offshoot or shockwave of the overall successful
Russian disinformation campaign in the U.S. through Trump’s own involvement in perpetuating
the fake news of Russian meddlers.
This theory attests to the strength of transnational right-wing solidarity between Germany
and the U.S., but more importantly, it demonstrates the importance of Trump’s particular cult of
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personality in overshadowing the role of Russian interference in Germany by force of his own
character appeal. That Trump’s base of support transcends language barriers and geography is a
strong indication that his anti-immigration platform and racist, fear-mongering rhetoric have
become the pillars of the emerging global far-right.
c. The Personality Factor
Until this analysis, I have made implicit throughout this paper the heavy significance of
Trump’s individual influence on the global right wing in contrast to the less individualist appeal
of the AfD party. This distinction poses the compelling question of the extent to which right
wing populism owes its recent successes to personality cults or the general will of the people
who, in the process of cumulative racism, pushed these political platforms into mainstream
media and positions of power. That Russian direct disinformation attacks did far less to faze
German politics than the transnational appeal of Trump’s particular anti-immigration platform
supposedly attests to the unique power of one’s individual authoritarian brand.
I argue that this revelation is unsurprising given the fame of American exceptionalism
and individualism through its reputation as the widely recognized leader in the post-Cold War
global order, in the arena of soft power (i.e. cultural influence and persuasion) as much as hard
power (i.e. economic and military strength). The phenomenon of American individualism bears a
long track record in the nation’s highest office especially. The celebrated charisma of John F.
Kennedy’s speeches and the folksy, direct rhetoric of Ronald Reagan are notable examples of the
importance of personal image on both ends of the political spectrum in watershed moments of
history: respectively, the Civil Rights movement and the era of neoliberal Reaganomics. Other
current world leaders—largely right wing populists—have echoed Trump’s controversial and
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loud persona, including Brazil’s president Jair Bolsonaro and the pro-Brexit Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, Boris Johnson.
On the other hand, Germany has lacked a true personality cult in its political leadership
since the death of history’s admittedly most notorious personality cult leader, Adolf Hitler,
having taken comprehensive anti-fascist measures to reform its political and educational systems
to prevent the rise or glorification of a similar dictator. These efforts have produced the strong
political cohesion described in the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ report on failed
Russian misinformation attacks in present-day Germany. However, racism, sexism, homophobia
and antisemitism continued to thrive in East and West Germany after the defeat of the Nazis, but
gained little international attention due to the broader sociopolitical turmoil of the country’s
division in the Cold War that immediately succeeded the Nazi era, as presented in the NGO
report “Germany After 1945”:
In studies carried out between 1946 and 1952 [in West Germany], one third of the
population showed strongly antisemitic attitudes, while another third
exhibited partially antisemitic tendencies. The younger generations, molded by
their experiences during the Nazi period, were found to be most stridently
antisemitic (Radvan and Troschtke 2012).
Therefore, this example of the general public sentiment in post-Nazi Germany
demonstrates merely the defeat of the Nazi regime, not Nazism as an ideology itself. Likewise, it
is important to note that despite the apparent overwhelming influence of distinct figures like
Trump in the global right wing movement, the core of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia has
long existed independently of these public personas. This process of introducing and sustaining
racist anti-migration sentiments in popular discourse again evokes the idea of cumulative racism,
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in which long standing sociological forces propel distinct figures into positions of prominence,
where they are now more easily than ever able to weaponize media to manipulate the same
sociological forces to their benefit.
d. The Anxieties of Globalization
The right wing populist platform largely bases its appeal on the nationalist rejection of
internationalism in the digital age of widely accessible travel and information. At the core of this
ideology lies the fear of the “other” encroaching on and dissolving one’s own perceived customs,
language, and values, all of which hold symbolic power as markers of national identity, which
ties deeply into personal identity and security for right wing populists. I have demonstrated that
immigration is the common point of concern among Trump and AfD supporters, rendering it
impossible to discuss nationalist fears and the attraction of right-wing parties or figures without
addressing immigration as the common priority.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have determined migration and media to be the most salient lenses
through which to examine the nature of the global right wing populist wave that has emerged in
Western countries within the past two decades. In doing so, I have explored political themes that
lie beyond the scope of migration alone and deserve further nuanced attention, such as the role of
misinformation, gender politics, and economic anxieties under the broader umbrella of
globalization. In the interest of maintaining focus on the nature of discursive construction of
migrants, I have also only briefly mentioned in my paper some concrete hate crimes in both
countries that have escalated from this compounding anti-immigrant discourse. These tragedies
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deserve further exploration under a different branch of research centered on the nature of
violence and terror itself.
My focus on Germany and the U.S. also limits the extent to which my argument can be
extrapolated to affirm the precise cohesion of the global right among other developed Western
countries, though I maintain that Germany’s role as the democratic and economic leader of
Europe has rendered it a strong country to compare with the U.S. regarding migration.
Nonetheless, my examination of migration discourse in the wider context of the global surge in
right wing popularity has proven that anti-immigration is the single common factor that unites
different right-leaning parties across national boundaries and voting demographics.
The similarities that contemporary German and American discourse on migration share
are striking, even more so in consideration of the dissimilar contexts that fueled this discourse.
Right wing parties in both countries and Russian meddlers capitalized on social media to amplify
a large volume of racist opinions into the mainstream media, thus normalizing racist language
about immigrants by using post-truth misinformation as fodder for the globalization-fueled,
pre-existing ontological anxieties of people. Even though a mass migration event and sexual
assaults preceded the Cologne 2016 discursive shift with no parallel in the U.S., the simultaneous
progression of discourse in Germany and the U.S. converged along the same historical racist
stereotypes about migrant men of color being sexual predators and terrorists.
This phenomenon affirms two critical points: the increased diffusion of media across
transnational boundaries, in which one country’s turmoil becomes a talking point for the
politicians of another, and the longstanding sociological roots of prejudice in both countries that
transcend current political administrations and the lesser priorities (e.g. economy) of the voting
demographics that empower these administrations. In this structure of cumulative racism and
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social media lies the formation of a strengthening global right community that unifies around the
platform of anti-immigration.
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